The “invisible terror” network exposed: Israel reveals structure of IRGC secret unit

In a joint operation by Mossad, the Shin Bet, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the internal structure of a secret special unit within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been uncovered. The unit specialized in organizing assassination attempts against senior Israeli officials and attacks on strategic infrastructure, Israeli ports, and vessels worldwide.

The publication of these details was authorized following the large-scale elimination of key operatives in the network during the war with Iran. At the same time, Israel’s international partners carried out a series of arrests targeting members of the network.

One of the most high-profile episodes linked to the group was a foiled sabotage attempt in Azerbaijan. Several weeks ago, local authorities neutralized a cell targeting the strategic Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline. In addition to the industrial target, the militants were preparing attacks on the Israeli embassy in Baku, a local synagogue, and leaders of Azerbaijan’s Jewish community.

During the arrests, authorities seized kamikaze drones and explosive devices. The investigation found that the group had conducted close physical surveillance and photographic monitoring of targets, receiving instructions directly from Tehran.

Israeli intelligence services were able to reconstruct the chain of command behind the covert mechanism step by step, with many of its links already eliminated.

Rahman Mokaddam (eliminated) headed the secret apparatus and led the Special Operations Department (Unit 4000). He was responsible for exporting terror beyond Iran’s borders and for smuggling advanced weaponry into Israel. Mokaddam operated under the direct patronage of IRGC intelligence chief Majid Khademi, who was also eliminated by the IDF.

Khademi, in his capacity as head of the intelligence apparatus, had in recent years overseen the expansion of terrorist activities worldwide. This included recruiting and training operatives both inside and outside Iran to gather intelligence on Israel’s political leadership, security personnel, military installations, Western targets, ports, and Israeli vessels globally.

Mohsen Suri (eliminated), a leading operative of Unit 4000, personally traveled abroad to brief local cells. He was killed in a safe house identified through joint efforts by Mossad and the Shin Bet.

Mahdi Yeke-Dehkan, known as “Doctor,” served as the coordinator of operations in Europe and Azerbaijan. His name had already appeared in intelligence reports in January 2026, when an attempt to smuggle kamikaze drones to Cyprus and conduct surveillance on the U.S. Incirlik Air Base in Türkiye was thwarted.

For years, Iran has built a system enabling it to carry out attacks through proxies while maintaining distance and avoiding legal or economic responsibility. Recently, the intensity of such efforts has increased, with IRGC operatives openly coordinating with pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to expand the scope of attacks.

In a joint statement, Israeli security agencies emphasized that despite Iran’s attempts to use terrorism as a complement to conventional warfare, the systematic dismantling of IRGC infrastructure and leadership is depriving Tehran of this tool. Cooperation with international intelligence partners to counter Iranian threats will continue in full.

Olga Bozhkova