In late April and early May, Azerbaijan once again became a focal point for visits by senior representatives of the European political establishment.
Opinion
Pragmatism versus declarations — it is precisely in this logic that the gap between the rhetoric of European institutions and the real policy of key EU states in the South Caucasus is becoming increasingly visible today.
Having made strides towards peace with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the country's West-leaning prime minister faces frustrated voters next month in a contest that has stoked Moscow’s interest.
With Armenia’s high-stakes parliamentary elections in June fast approaching, the shadow of the April 1 summit between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan looms larger than ever over the country’s political landscape.
Against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical turbulence and the transformation of the global security and economic architecture, high-ranking European leaders are visiting Azerbaijan one after another.
Russia’s contemporary policy in the Caucasus is often described through the language of security, peacekeeping and regional stability. Yet its deeper roots lie in an older imperial habit: treating the region as a strategic frontier to be managed, reorganized and kept within Moscow’s sphere of influence.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Azerbaijan placed Kyiv’s wartime diplomacy inside a wider regional shift, in which Baku is acting with increasing independence and Moscow’s assumed authority in the South Caucasus is becoming harder to sustain.
Former UN International Court of Justice prosecutor Luis Ocampo threatens pro-Western Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan with coup.
In recent years, European politics has increasingly revealed a troubling tendency: instead of exerting pressure on the aggressor, efforts are often redirected toward those in a more vulnerable position.
History rarely forgives those who try to pass off their own mistakes as external circumstances. Memory, like facts, is stubborn: it cannot be erased by loud statements or rewritten after the fact.
The visit of Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš to Azerbaijan marks a strategic reset in bilateral relations after years of limited high-level engagement. It reflects shifting European energy priorities, expanding industrial and defense cooperation, and a broader transition toward long-term economic integration, diversification, and joint projects beyond traditional oil-based trade frameworks.
As Azerbaijan and Armenia discuss trade cooperation, Russia is muscling in. Baku should beware of Moscow’s charm offensive.
European parliamentary resolutions targeting Azerbaijan have triggered a strong diplomatic response from Baku, raising concerns over sovereignty, territorial integrity, and external interference in the peace process with Armenia. The timing, coinciding with EU negotiations, suggests potential political pressure, while highlighting broader tensions around post-conflict realities and competing narratives in the South Caucasus.
Of course, any country has the right to decide how much to pay its uniformed personnel. But the choice of beneficiaries—special forces, special operations, and intelligence units—is at the very least indicative and raises questions.
Larijani was the mastermind behind much of the Iranian regime’s policy and a man with a long history of oppressing the Azerbaijani nation.
What began as an intellectual vision of unity in language and culture a century ago is now translating into concrete cooperation across the Turkic world, officials said on April 19 at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. They highlighted joint initiatives and a UNESCO-backed recognition of Turkic languages.
On April 16–18, a high-level Azerbaijani delegation led by President Ilham Aliyev took part in the 5th Antalya Diplomacy Forum, which in recent years has established itself as one of the key platforms for informal alignment on the most sensitive issues of the international agenda.
Azerbaijan would not enter the conflict, but it would actively manage its consequences.
The United States needs to develop and implement a new Caucasus strategy to account for the region’s connectivity alternatives to the Persian Gulf.
At a time of sustained resistance by Baku to the Western practice of double standards, Azerbaijan has, to some extent, grown accustomed to this phenomenon with a sense of heightened readiness.
After more than three decades of closure, the Türkiye-Armenia border may soon reopen. A string of recent developments, including the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to Yerevan, agreements to simplify visa procedures, and moves toward direct land trade, suggest that normalization is shifting from cautious diplomacy toward practical implementation.
April 4 was International Mine Awareness Day. For much of the world, it is just another regular day, or at best a moment of reflection, a calendar entry, perhaps a social media post.
Over the past three decades, one of the most effective business platforms in the post-Soviet space has been established in the South Caucasus, combining the energy, transport-logistics, and agro-industrial potential of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Iran’s official readout of the telephone conversation between Foreign Ministers Jeyhun Bayramov and Abbas Araghchi offers a revealing insight into Tehran’s current strategic messaging.