Opinion97- Page

A case filed by Armenia against Azerbaijan in the International Court of Justice could have significant implications for the conflict. And it carries risks for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

After nearly three decades with no relations and a closed border, the two countries’ leaders sound more hopeful than they have in years. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently said that Yerevan has been receiving “positive public signals” from Turkey. 

Rumors of a breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations have no basis in fact. Turkey and Armenia cannot undertake a normalization of their relations without including Azerbaijan.

Armenia, the historian believes, will survive despite the efforts of its former leaders to bury it by dragging the country into expansionist schemes.

The Azerbaijani government has been undertaking a campaign against corrupt officials for nearly two years now, but in a series of recent hearings the accused say they have been set up.

Cooperation between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Armenia had strengthened by the 1960s, though the beginnings of a close alliance between Kurdish nationalists and Armenian Dashnaks dates back to the early 20th century.

As new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi forms his government, Baku and Tehran are expected to enter the next uneasy and uncertain phase in their bilateral relations. In particular, issues relating to the unfinished railway segment of the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) and the controversial hydropower projects on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border remain unresolved.

Many things have changed since the first Karabakh war (1988–1994), when Armenia emerged victorious. However, the years leading up to the Second Karabakh war in 2020 show that, in the long term, Yerevan lost out on many opportunities owing to the events that unfolded during the first war.

Azerbaijan gaining independence in 1991 spurred on political activism in South Azerbaijan as well. During this period, various legal and illegal parties were established by Iranian Azerbaijanis. The main organization founded at that time was the South Azerbaijan Devotees Organization established in the early 1990s.

In this post-war period, and in the wake of its gains in the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan is in the process of pursuing ambitious infrastructure and connectivity projects spanning the transport, energy, and digital spheres.

Before Protestantism, pious Christians described hell as a place of eternal torment and paradise as a place of permanent pleasure and rest, while Protestantism opposed this concept.

For the last three decades normalising diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey was impossible when Armenia occupied twenty prevent of Azerbaijani territory in 1994-2000.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan has sparked concern in Central Asia and Russia that this development will generate refugee flows into both regions and that among those migrants will be members of radical Islamist groups who might mobilize extremist forces within the five countries of Central Asia and the republics of Russia’s North Caucasus, threatening the existing governments.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established as a multilateral association to ensure security across the vast Eurasian region and promote good-neighborly and friendly relations among member states, encouraging their further effective cooperation in various fields.

The South Caucasus—home to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—is a geographic region that oftentimes is believed not to have developed regionalism. The reason for such an argument is the lack of political stability caused by security and territorial is- sues. With the ceasefire truce brokered by Russia and the declaration of Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh war, new regional perspectives are in sight for the region.

Georgian activists of Azeri origin are collecting signatures for a petition to amend a law governing surnames, revealing the complexities of identity in the region.

The Turkic Council aims to establish a close relationship between press members of Turkic Republics, Azerbaijan's Presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev said, underlining the council's potential to boost cooperation among the Turkic world.

Although Tehran and Moscow share the goal of keeping Western powers out of the Caspian Sea, they are not in a full alliance mode, and each has its own policy line.

Introduction The Second Karabakh War ended the three-decade-old Armenia– Azerbaijan conflict, which has had a great impact on the formation of a new geopolitical and geo-economic situation in the South

NATO and the European Union need to think outside the box with respect to how GUAM’s four members can be anchored within the Euro-Atlantic community of states.

This paper covers the South Caucasus policy of Turkey after the 44-Day War be- tween Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. The aim of the research is to investigate the role of Turkey, which supported Azerbaijan politically and morally in the war, in the South Caucasus. This article concludes that, after this war, a new geopolitical situation has emerged in the South Caucasus region. In this new geopolitics, Turkish soldiers have been deployed, alongside those from Russia, in the Joint Monitoring Centre to observe the ceasefire in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Turkey became a kind of guarantor of the liberated Azerbaijani territories through the Shusha Declaration signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Additionally, according to the trilateral statement of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia that was signed on 11 January, it was decided to establish a new corridor that is planned to pass through Armenia to connect Turkey with Azerbaijan. Moreover, Turkey–Azerbaijan strategic relations have entered a new phase in terms of economic, military, and defence industry technologies. In short, after the 44-Day War, Turkey gained an advantageous position in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.