While Iran and the United States argue, Baku turns the crisis into a strategic advantage

Against the backdrop of the current ceasefire and ongoing negotiations between Tehran and Washington, Iran appears to be trying to make maximum use of this pause to form a kind of “coalition of the dissatisfied” — states that are not ready to unconditionally accept the American vision for the future of the Middle East.

At least this is how the influential Financial Times sees the situation in its latest article on Iran. In effect, the war involving Iran is about the future order of the whole of Western Asia. The United States is offering the region the framework of the Abraham Accords, while Iran is trying to exploit contradictions among allies and is proposing something resembling a “coalition of dissenters.”

However, the possibilities of such a strategy remain limited. Most states in the region are not prepared to seriously worsen relations with the United States, which continues to play a key role in the Middle East security system. The American military presence remains in the Persian Gulf states, while a significant part of the armed forces of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and several other countries is integrated into Western weapons, intelligence and air defense systems. Moreover, many regional elites view relations with Washington not only as a matter of security, but also as an important tool for maintaining their own international status and access to technologies, investment and financial markets.

Even when individual states demonstrate dissatisfaction with American policy or seek to pursue a more independent foreign policy course, this is usually not about breaking ties with the United States, but about expanding room for maneuver between different centers of power.

In general, any war, when passions are heated to the limit, is not the best time for strategic decisions. That is why many countries in the region currently prefer to adopt a wait-and-see position. Any major war is accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty, and in such conditions states rarely make long-term strategic decisions. It remains unclear how the negotiations between the United States and Iran will end, how durable the ceasefire will prove to be, and what the future balance of power in the region will look like. Therefore, most Middle Eastern players today are more likely to watch developments, assess the consequences of the conflict and preserve their freedom of maneuver, without rushing to make a final choice between competing regional projects.

However, there are also states for which a period of uncertainty opens up not only risks, but also new opportunities. The main thing is to be able to make proper use of the emerging “window of opportunity.” One of the few countries in the region that has so far managed to do this is Azerbaijan.

Having significantly strengthened its position after the Second Karabakh War, Baku has considerably expanded the space for an independent foreign policy. Whereas Azerbaijan previously had to take into account the balance of interests of external players in the region to a large extent, today it increasingly determines for itself with whom, in what formats and on what terms it will engage. Moreover, Baku is gradually turning its geographic position and control over key transport and logistics routes into an important strategic resource.

Against the backdrop of growing competition between Russia, the West, Türkiye, China, Iran and the countries of Central Asia, Azerbaijan’s importance as a transit, energy and diplomatic hub is noticeably increasing. This is precisely why the current regional turbulence is not only a challenge for Baku, but also an opportunity to strengthen its own international weight, expand its circle of partners and increase its role in shaping a new configuration of ties across the space from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean.

Surprising as it may seem, Baku today remains one of the few capitals in the region that simultaneously maintains active relations with both Iran and Israel, while refusing to allow itself to be drawn into this confrontation. Despite close military-technical and economic cooperation with Israel, Azerbaijan has also consistently developed relations with Tehran, implementing joint transport, energy and infrastructure projects. In the current critical situation, both opposing sides are seeking not to lose Baku’s goodwill.

For Israel, Azerbaijan remains an important partner in energy and military-technical cooperation, while for Iran, stable relations with its northern neighbor — a country with which it shares a long border and which has considerable influence over developments in the South Caucasus — are of fundamental importance. As a result, Baku finds itself in a rare position for the region: both sides of the conflict are interested not in putting pressure on Azerbaijan, but, on the contrary, in preserving its benevolent neutrality.

But neutrality in the current Iranian crisis is not only a way to avoid being drawn into someone else’s war. For Azerbaijan, it is also an opportunity to further strengthen its position as a regional energy, transport and logistics hub. The higher the level of instability around the country, the greater the value of relatively secure routes for the supply of energy resources, cargo and goods.

Against the backdrop of risks facing traditional transport corridors through Iran and the overall uncertainty in the region, the importance of routes passing through Azerbaijan is growing. This applies both to the Middle Corridor between China and Europe and to energy projects linking the Caspian region with European markets. Under these conditions, Baku has an opportunity not only to increase transit revenues, but also to strengthen its political significance for a wide range of external players — from the European Union and Türkiye to the states of Central Asia and China.

However, for Azerbaijan it is important not only to take advantage of the current situation, but also to consolidate the gains it has achieved for the post-conflict period. Baku understands well that wars and crises eventually come to an end, and with them some of the opportunities they create also disappear. Therefore, the task is to transform the temporary rise in the importance of Azerbaijani routes into a long-term competitive advantage.

In effect, Azerbaijan is seeking to use the current crisis as an accelerator for processes that will allow it to preserve its role as a key transport, logistics and energy hub of Eurasia even after the current stage of regional turbulence comes to an end. Judging by Baku’s actions in recent years, this is precisely one of the strategic objectives it is now pursuing.

Ilgar Velizade

Minval Politika